North Sea Helicopter Incidents 1994-2024

North Sea Helicopter Incidents 1994-2024

‘I do fly to work by helicopter. It’s a reality.’ – Mike Ashley.

Hopping on and off helicopters to get to and from platforms/vessels is not without hazard. Choppers occasionally have a bad habit of going into the drink or impacting mother earth hard, with fatal outcomes, even though safety and maintenance routines were world-class. It is historically calculated that North Sea helicopter flights were tenfold more dangerous than transatlantic airplane journeys, albeit multifold safer than riding a motorbike on Thai roads.

The North Sea is many things, but she is neither hospitable nor forgiving, especially if you inadvertently end up submerged in her cold and often fiercely rough waters.

The following, listed chronologically by date, are concise synopsises of oil and gas field exploration-related helicopter incidents and accidents that have taken place in the North Sea basin sectors and the Norwegian Sea from the winter of 1964 through the spring of 2024. The listings include elementary data and salvage diving-related information; they do not include extensive technical details available in the individual elaborately detailed government oversight accident investigation reports. The following list of incidents and accidents do not include Air Force, military, Naval, police, air ambulances or private rotorcraft nor near misses that were not deemed reportable. Neither does the list include incidents in the Baltic, Arctic, Barents, and eastern Atlantic seas that surround the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea.

It is entirely possible that although I researched this subject thoroughly, there may have been incidents and accidents that remain unreported.

Reported North Sea helicopter incidents and accidents – 1994-2024

Click on the image thumbnail to the right to read a synopsis of each incident.

(Note: The yellow highlighted text is the aircraft Identification number)

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On 19 November 1997 (Fatal)

A Sikorsky S-61N Mk II G-BCLC /SAR operated by HM Coast Guard/Bristow Helicopters Ltd, was called out on a SAR mission at Bressay Shetland Islands, North Sea. Two pilots, a winch operator and a winchman (SAR operative), were aboard the aircraft. This mission was so demanding that the subsequent report of the four men’s heroic actions merits mention and reading in its entirety.

The dangers these brave SAR operatives regularly face deserve praise and respect. Jan Arild Skjeie, with whom I graduated as a mine diver commando in 1987 at DFS, became a Norwegian Helicopter SAR operative. He was active in this position until his well-deserved retirement in December 2022.

I admire and envy Jan Arild and his colleagues, who regularly face challenges in their chosen occupation, saving people’s lives and experiencing the satisfaction of defying their trepidation while savouring the endorphins and adrenaline that accompany fear.

The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch conducted an inspector’s inquiry into the fatal MV Green Lilly incident. They published the following bulletin of the events directly related to the SAR helicopter and the loss of the winchman. In the main, the sequence of events was determined from crew reports and a replay of the Combined Voice and Flight Data Recorder (CVFDR). At 08:36 on 19 November 1997 hours, the search and rescue (SAR) crew at Sumburgh were brought to standby upon receiving a mayday call.

The refrigerated general cargo vessel MV Green Lilly, measuring one hundred and seven point sixty-eight meters in length and fourteen point seventy-four meters in breadth, with a gross tonnage of three thousand six hundred and twenty-four, had departed from Lerwick Harbour, Shetland Isles, en route to Ivory Coast, West Africa with holds of frozen fish. At 06:10, after having suffered a seawater, fire, and general service pump supply-line fracture in the machine room, resulting in engine failure, she was adrift with a northerly bearing and was in dire straits. Her position was ten nautical miles southeast of Bard Head, the southernmost point of Bressay, one of the Shetland Isles. She had a crew of fifteen. The weather had increased from southeast force seven to severe gale force nine and eventually evolved into storm force ten. Shetland Coastguard was alerted by the vessel master at 06:44. Available tugs in the area were forthwith contacted, and at 07:40, a general “Pan Pan” alert was transmitted on channel 16 VHF. At 08:44, a “Mayday Relay” was broadcast. Three ocean-going tugs responded to the emergency.

At 09:51, a second “Mayday Relay” was broadcast, drawing a response from the fifteen thousand gross tonnes tanker, MT Sidsel Knutsen, positioned twenty nautical miles southeast of MV Green Lily was asked by Shetland Coastguard to proceed towards the casualty and stand-by on arrival. Using a Coastguard helicopter was considered but initially judged unsafe due to the high wind speeds. Onboard MV Green Lilly at about 13:00, the chief officer, the second officer, and three seamen went aft to re-secure mooring ropes that had broken loose from their lashings. Following the master’s instructions, the mooring ropes were transferred to an upper deck, but in the process, the chief officer and one of the seamen were injured. Both men were bruised, but the chief officer’s leg was fractured. The AHT Gargano arrived first on the scene, and the crews, with a joint effort, managed to connect a tow line to the stricken vessel; however, after fifty-one minutes, the towline parted, injuring one of the tug’s crew. Due to the injured sailor, AHT Gargano would depart the scene around 15:00. By 12:18 hours, the Shetland-based Tug Tystie had attached a tow line to MV Green Lily and had her under tow en route to Dales Voe. The SAR helicopter was requested to remain on standby until the vessels arrived at Dales Voe harbour.

At 12:39 hours, the Tystie tug’s tow line parted, and at 12:58 hours, the SAR crew in helicopter ‘LC’ were scrambled. The aircraft was airborne at 13:09 hours and flew to a position two point seven nautical miles southeast of Bard Head, arriving on the scene at 13:19 hours.

When the helicopter arrived, the MV Green Lily was rolling with her starboard beam to the wind and swell. The surface wind was estimated as coming from 150° with a strength of fifty to seventy knots, the sea state eight to nine and the visibility five thousand metres. The Tug Tystie and AHT Gargano were in attendance. The anchor handling tug supply AHTS Maersk Champion and the Lerwick lifeboat were proceeding to the scene.

It was decided to winch off the two injured crew members as soon as possible. Selecting a suitable winching area proved difficult as cranes and cables overhung the smooth deck surfaces. The preferred area was the forward part of the aft raised hatch cover, and based on this, a dummy approach was made. The ship’s master was briefed on the heaving-in-line (hi-line) transfer method. The commander positioned ‘LC’ on the ship’s leeward side, and the control hi-line was lowered. The deck crew took the control hi-line and moved to the well between the raised hatch and the bridge structure, a less-than-ideal position from the helicopter crew’s viewpoint.

However, the ship was now only about one point five nautical miles from the shore, and the rolling motion had worsened to the extent that the commander decided to abort the rescue attempt until one of the tugs could stabilise the ship by hauling her bow into the wind. The Tug Tystie eventually managed to get a line to the MV Green Lily, but the tow line parted before it had any effect on the ship’s orientation. The master was then advised to slip the ship’s anchors to slow the drift towards the rocky shore; after some time, the starboard anchor was lowered, but the port anchor winch was sized, and the anchor would not drop.

The ship’s head was now about 45° off the wind, and the RNLI Lerwick Lifeboat that had arrived on the scene at 13:50 came alongside her port lee side and managed, over several manoeuvres made in challenging conditions, to rescue five members of the crew. With little sea room available, the RNLI lifeboat had to abandon further attempts, moving off to a safer standby position heading into the wind. The AHTS Maersk Champion grappled the MV Green Lily’s anchor and started to turn the vessel, but the anchor cable parted. Although the ship was now very close to the shore, the situation appeared more stable, and the helicopter commander decided to start winching operations.

At about 14:41 hours, the helicopter manoeuvred into the winching position and lowered the control hi-line. The winchman was lowered onto the deck with two recovery straps to recover the ten remaining crewmen, two at a time.

At about 14:43 hours, it was reported on the radio that the starboard anchor cable had parted, and the MV Green Lily again began to drift stern first towards the coast. The situation now became more critical, and winching started at 14:44 hours.

Substantial and rapidly varying flight control positions were recorded as the commander strived to maintain the helicopter’s position; the height varied between forty and ninety feet, and, as the ground speed was zero, the values recorded as airspeed gave an indication of wind speed. This was of the order of thirty-five knots with several gusts exceeding fifty knots.

As the third lift took place, the master was informed to proceed onto the deck immediately to be winched off. The fourth lift had started, leaving the master, one crewman and the winchman still aboard. The master reported at 14:50 hours that the vessel was aground and beginning to break up. The ship was now rolling violently; the commander noted that, for him to enable and maintain hovering references, the helicopter was held about 30° out of the wind and holding about 10° of a port bank. He was having difficulty keeping clear of the vessel’s superstructure. It was decided to get the winchman to ‘hook on’ with the last two crewmen; winching three people at a time is within the capability of the equipment but would only be used in an emergency such as was deemed to exist at the time. The winch operator recalled seeing all three people on the deck engulfed by a large wave as he prepared to lift them off; as the ship rolled back, he winched the last two crew members off. The winchman was not in radio contact with the helicopter, and despite the winch operator’s hand signals, he had not attached himself to the hook. Once the last two crewmen had been pulled into the cabin, the wire and hook were immediately sent back down to the winchman.

At 14:56 hours, the ship rolled violently, and huge waves broke over the deck. As the cable was winched out, the winch operator became aware that the control hi-line appeared to have become snagged in the ship’s superstructure. Thirty seconds later, while trying to release the control hi-line, the winch operator noticed that the winchman was no longer on the deck. Five seconds later, the helicopter momentarily rolled 8° to the right, and to avoid further endangering it and its occupants, the winch operator decided to activate the cable shear system.

The noise of the cartridge firing was audible to the crew and was recorded on the CVFDR. The winch operator advised the commander that the cable had not sheared and the control hi-line was still attached. Undoubtedly, the winchman had already been washed overboard when the cable shear system was operated. Fortunately, the control hi-line became unsnagged and was clear of the ship’s structure. The winch operator managed to raise the hook to about two feet of the winch mechanism. He could now see that the top end of the control hi-line had wound itself around the hook, effectively bypassing the weak link. He was able to cut the line free using the bolt-cropper provided as part of the backup equipment.

At about 14:58 hours, the commander advised the Shetland Coastguard that the winchman was lost overboard. The winchman had been swept overboard and repeatedly bashed against the ship’s side. He was last seen in the sea with his life jacket inflated. His helmet was missing, he was covered with oil, and there appeared to be no sign of life. The winch was no longer usable, so there was no way the helicopter crew could attempt a rescue, and the location and conditions were such that the lifeboat couldn’t approach. Even if the helicopter winch had still been available, a recovery would not have been feasible in such harsh conditions.

The ten crewmen rescued from the MV Green Lily were flown to the Gilbert Bain Hospital at Clickimin and disembarked at 15:05 hours. The helicopter was then flown to Sumburgh, where it landed at 15:23 hours, where a replacement winch could be fitted. A second aircraft with a serviceable winch took off again at 15:50 hours, with a replacement crew to continue the search for the winchman to no avail. The rescue attempt was suspended overnight and resumed at 08:00 the following day using land-based coastguards and two helicopters. At 12:49, a body was recovered off the South Isle of Gletness by one of the SAR helicopters and brought to Clickimin for transfer to Gilbert Bain Hospital. The deceased was formally identified as that of the missing winchman. The MV Green Lilly was destroyed by the immense forces of the sea and the rugged rocky shoreline.

(Explanation of hi-line use: The control hi-line is a forty-six metre-long nylon line with a karabiner on each end. A sixty-eight-kilogram ‘weak link’ between the line and the karabiner is attached to the winch wire hook. Weighted bags (four point five kilograms each) are connected to the karabiner at the other end; the number of weighted bags attached depends on the wind strength. The control hi-line can be used whenever a lack of visual reference or obstacle clearance between the helicopter and the vessel is such that an excessive workload is placed on the crew to execute the transfer. The appropriate weights are attached to the lower end of the hi-line, the top end is attached to the winch hook, and the line is then lowered from the cabin door. The line is hand-lowered until the weights land in the transfer area. Once the control hi-line is safely in hand on the deck, the helicopter is manoeuvred into the transfer position, generally to the vessel’s left. The winchman is winched out from a low hover at about deck height. As he is lowered, the helicopter climbs to a higher hover, and the winch cable is run out to keep the winchman’s height above the surface (about six to nine metres), and his position relative to the vessel is constant. Once sufficient altitude has been attained, the deck party will haul in the control hi-line to bring the winchman towards the vessel. This procedure is reversed to effect the transfer from the ship to the helicopter. It is essential that the deck crew maintain control of the control hi-line at all times, particularly that they do not secure it to, or allow it to become entangled with, any part of the vessel’s structure.)

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On 20 December 1997 (Fatal)

It is prudent to add more details of this particular incident as the report elaborates on the demanding workdays of pilots. For those who might believe the profession is similar to road transport driver’s work, i.e. “a glorified bus driver,” a simple walk in the park but accompanied by plenty of money, with relatively short easy days, could be no farther from the truth. Instead, it is a challenging profession that demands much technical insight and spatial intellect accompanied by much responsibility. By no means should a road transport driver’s profession be mentioned in derogative terms; however, there are significant differences.

The two pilots, captain and first officer (co-pilot) of the Sikorsky S-76 B helicopter, were scheduled for a duty time of twelve hours, starting at 06:45, in which five shuttle flight sorties over Nederland’s sector of the North Sea had to be executed. Both pilots were qualified for the mission. The captain acted as pilot flying (PF) during the first three sorties. The pilots switched roles, starting with the fourth sortie, and the first officer who had not been flying (PNF) became (PF). According to company standard practice, the (PF) occupied the right seat. The first four sorties were uneventful.

The fifth and last sortie started from L7-Q (accommodation platform-L7 field main complex). After take-off at 16:50, the helicopter was scheduled to return to Den Helder Airport’s heliport with intermediate landings on L4-A (drilling, production & accommodation platform-L4 field), the three-legged Paragon C463 jack-up drilling rig Noble Ronald Hoope (Ex-Neddrill 3), the L7-A and again the L7-Q before returning to home base, ashore. The cloud base was two thousand feet, with cloud layers at five hundred feet and patches at four hundred feet. The wind was light and variable. Visibility was three nautical miles. Take-off was after sunset; the night was dark, and neither the moon nor stars were visible.

Start-up and take-off were uneventful, and the pilots proceeded to L4-A at five hundred feet. As the PF, the first officer flew the approach; however, due to obstacles at the first officer (PF) side, the captain took over the controls and performed an uneventful landing. At 17:01, the pilots took off from L4-A and proceeded at one thousand feet to the jack-up Noble Ronald Hoope, a well-lit vertical structure. The approach and landing were uneventful. However, the first officer (PF) remarked that the landing was rather difficult with almost no wind.

At 17:15, after six passengers had embarked, the pilots lifted off from the jack-up Noble Ronald Hoope and proceeded on an easterly course towards the L7-A (satellite production platform with no superstructure-L7 Field). The elevation of the L7-A helideck was one hundred feet above mean sea level, and the helicopter landing area was clearly marked with yellow lights, but there was no visual landing aid. The first officer (PF) flew the helicopter using the flight director and autopilot. Halfway between the jack-up Noble Ronald Hoope and L7-A, the first officer (PF) selected five hundred feet on the AL 300 Command Display and initiated a coupled descent to five hundred feet to continue the flight below the cloud base. The aircraft’s speed was reduced to one hundred and twenty knots.

At this point, the captain (PNF) adjusted the setting of his pressure altimeter to match the pressure altimeter reading with the readout of the radio altimeter. During the initial approach, the pilots received verbal deck clearance for L7-A. The radio operator on L7-Q provided an updated wind directional reference informing that the wind came from the south. However, the pilot’s approach and landing direction were based on the flight management system (FMS) wind information that indicated wind coming from the east. A straight-in approach was planned and executed since the average wind readout indicated the wind was from an easterly direction. At 17:24, approximately two nautical miles from L7-A helideck, the height on the radio altimeter was two hundred feet with an indicated airspeed of seventy knots. Shortly after, the first officer (PF) decoupled the flight director. At 17.26, just before the decision point, normally fifty feet above the elevation of the helideck with an indicated aircraft speed (IAS) of thirty knots, the first officer (PF) initiated a go-around because she considered the helicopter was too high and too fast. After the call “go around,” the first officer (PF) increased collective, continued straight ahead and started the climb. Eleven seconds after the call “go around,” the captain (PNF) advised the first officer (PF) to turn. The first officer (PF) started a left-climbing turn and engaged the flight director.

During the climb, the captain (PNF) called: “Okay, stay at this altitude, not any higher.”

The First Officer (PF) reacted by levelling off and pressing the ALT HOLD button on the flight director’s control panel. The landing gear was not retracted during the go-around. The first officer (PF) made a left-hand circuit coached by the PNF, who had visual contact with L7-A.

At 17:27, the pilots approached L7-A for the second time. The helicopter turned to final, and at that moment, the first officer (PF) regained visual with L7-A. Once again, the first officer (FP) indicated unhappiness with the situation, but the captain (PNF) convinced the first officer (PF) to continue. In this turn, at approximately half a nautical mile out, the first officer (PF) decoupled the flight director to decelerate faster than the use of the flight director system permitted.

Shortly after that, the first officer (PF) said, “No, this is also not going to work because we are much too high and much too fast.”

The captain (PNF) said he judged the situation normal and convinced her to continue, after which the first officer (PF) lowered the collective pitch lever and, at the same time, raised the nose of the helicopter.

The first officer (PNF) called out, “The gear is down, and I have sixty knots,” and four seconds later, “One hundred, not lower.”

The first officer (PF) was surprised because, at that moment, the first officer (PF) did not intend to descend to and below one hundred feet. The first officer (PF) looked at the flight instruments and read one hundred feet on her pressure altimeter. In response, the first officer (PF) applied a large amount of power by raising the collective pitch lever. The captain (PNF) suddenly read fifty feet height on his radio altimeter. He also pulled collective. Both pilots did not positively feel the helicopter react to the power application before the helicopter impacted the water.

The impact took place at 17:29; as the floats were not activated/inflated, the helicopter almost immediately rolled to starboard and inverted. All occupants successfully evacuated the aircraft but could not launch either of the two internal heli-rafts, both of which were on the starboard side. They could climb on the upturned fuselage, but after approximately ten minutes, the aircraft sank to the seabed at a depth of twenty-eight metres. The sea water temperature was seven degrees centigrade with a wave height of one point five to two metres.

The L7-Q radio operator, who was responsible for the flight, was informed at 17.30 by personnel on platform L7-A that the helicopter had crashed into the sea. He immediately alerted two helicopters (Schreiner 4 and Schreiner 6) and the supply vessels PSV Smit Lloyd 55 and Smit Lloyd 57 who were all operating in the Pentacon field area.

At 17:32, he notified the Netherlands Coast Guard, who raised the SAR alarm at 17:36 for two helicopters. The SAR helicopters took off from De Kooy Naval Air Station at 18:18 for Pedro 2 and 18:35 for Pedro 4. The Schreiner helicopters only carried VHF and could not receive the UHF Sarbe locator beacon signal. At 17:36, the crew of Schreiner 4 visually spotted the life vest lights of the survivors. Due to problems with the helicopter’s searchlight, Schreiner 6 was called to assist. Schreiner 6 arrived at the scene at 17:55 and, while circling over the survivors, guided the PSV Smit Lloyd 55 to the position of the survivors.

At 18:06, PSV Smit Lloyd 55 arrived on site, launched a Zodiac rescue craft and a few minutes later started to recover the survivors. At 18:30, the captain of PSV, Smit Lloyd 55, reported via VHF to L7-Q that eight survivors were on board; however, one rescued passenger was unconscious. Pedro 2 arrived on site at 18:37, initially overhead PSV Smit Lloyd 57 and proceeded to PSV Smit Lloyd 55. At 18:40, a medical doctor was lowered to the ship by hoist. A second doctor was lowered by Pedro 4 at 19:03. CPR on the unconscious passenger started at 18:45. At 18.58 L7-Q was informed that repetitive resuscitation and revival attempts had not been successful. It was then decided that the survivors would remain aboard PSV Smit Lloyd 55 with one of the doctors and disembark at Den Helder Port.

The accident was most probably initiated by a considerable power reduction during the turn to final to platform L7-A thereby creating the onset for a high rate of descent, which went unnoticed by the crew. When the pilots realised the situation, the application of collective power reduced the sink rate but came too late to prevent the helicopter from hitting the water. The OSS Smit Orca crew and specialists of KLM ERA and the Netherlands Aviation Safety Board carried out the salvage operation. The helicopter was recovered from the seabed without inflicting further substantial damage.

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On 23 August 2013 (Fatal)

An Aerospatiale/Eurocopter AS 332L2 Super Puma G-WNSB helicopter operated by CHC Scotia Helicopters Ltd, with two pilots and sixteen passengers, was returning to Aberdeen from MODU Borgsten Dolphin eleven nautical miles south of the Alvin North platform, UK sector, on anchors two hundred and forty-eight nautical miles North of Aberdeen. Due to the distance, the pilots would fly via Sumburg Airport to refuel en route to Aberdeen Airport’s heliport.

During the approach to Sumburg Airport’s runway number 09, the commander applied insufficient collective pitch control input to maintain the approach profile and the target approach airspeed of eighty knots resulting in inadequate engine power needed for lift and forward momentum. The helicopter’s airspeed was reduced continuously during the final approach. Maintaining flight control was lost, and the aircraft continued to descend.

During the latter stages of the approach, the helicopter’s airspeed had, unnoticed by the pilots, decreased below thirty-five knots, and a high rate of descent had developed. At a very late stage, when the helicopter was in a critically low energy state, the commander’s attempt to recover the situation was unsuccessful, and the aircraft struck the sea’s surface approximately one point seven nautical miles from Shetland Isles to the west of Sumburgh Airport. It rapidly filled with water and rolled over, inverting but was kept afloat by the flotation bags that had deployed.

Four passengers died from trauma or drowning; two did not escape from the upturned fuselage, one was found by the coastguard helicopter, lifeless, floating on the surface, and one subsequently died in one of the life rafts. Both pilots and twelve passengers survived and were rescued; four suffered severe injuries (one of the crew and one of the surviving passengers sustained spinal fractures), and eight suffered lesser injuries.

As the survivors surfaced on both sides of the upturned helicopter, they reported that the sea was covered by fuel and debris. The co-pilot was able to climb onto the upturned fuselage and release the life raft from the right sponson (now located on the left side) by pulling the D-ring located on the bottom of the sponson. He stated that the raft was slow to come out of the housing, so he pulled it free, which allowed it to inflate normally. He and a passenger were able to assist the commander, who had an incapacitating back injury, and some other survivors onto the upturned fuselage and then into the heli-raft.

The co-pilot then deployed the second heli-raft using the D-ring, again pulling the raft from the sponson as it was slow to inflate. Ten survivors were now in the first life raft. The co-pilot recalled that the painter’s lines were excessively tangled, so, given the concern that the helicopter might sink, both lines were cut, allowing the rafts to float free from the wreckage. The co-pilot and a passenger left the heli-raft and swam to the second life raft, which was now fully inflated, intending to manoeuvre it to the five passengers in the water, but they were unable to reach them.

The first SAR helicopter arrived on the scene twenty-three minutes after the accident. This helicopter recovered four persons from the sea and flew them to Sumburgh Airport before returning to the scene. All the survivors were rescued by the SAR helicopters. Five were winched up directly from the water, and the other nine from the two life rafts.

A surviving passenger committed suicide in 2017 due to the consequences of injuries and PTSD “caused” by the crash.

The inverted helicopter drifted onto the rocky shoreline following the accident, making the investigation team’s work more complex as the extent of the damage caused by the impact with the water was difficult to assess from the recovered wreckage.

Repeated contact with Quendale Bay rocks on the headland of the southern tip of Shetlands resulted in the forward and rear fuselage sections detaching. Both engines separated from the fuselage, collectively conjoined with the main gearbox and rotor mast/head. Only the rear section of the fuselage stayed afloat, supported by the undamaged single flotation bag.

The DSV Bibby Polaris arrived on sight, and despite attempts to use a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) from the vessel, items of wreckage could only be recovered in a period of relatively calm during short-duration dives by a team of inshore divers utilising lift bags. As such, the fuselage’s forward wreckage’s section recovery was limited. The air accident investigation commission ruled pilot error as a probable cause, as no signs of technical failure were found. All helicopters of the same type were grounded while the accident investigation was in progress.

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On 31 October 2021 (Non-Fatal)

A Sikorsky S-92A LN-OHN /SAR, operated by Bristow Norway AS, was involved in a SAR exercise near the Ekofisk Lima platform in the Ekofisk Field, Norwegian sector. The crew consisted of two pilots, a winch operator, and a winchman (SAR operative). During the exercise, the SAR operative sustained an injury while being lowered onto the deck of the MPSV Skandi Hugen in darkness. The weather conditions at the time were challenging, with a wind speed of forty-two knots, gusting up to fifty-two knots, and a significant wave height exceeding four meters with maximum seas of six meters.

During the hoist exercise, the SAR Operative wore a back brace and hip briefs under the survival suit and wore a manually inflatable flight life vest with an emergency breathing system (EBS) (the use of automatically inflated life vests is not practical); a small oxygen tank with a nozzle, a helmet, a harness, a knife and flippers.

Below is a step-by-step explanation, elaborating upon the challenges, dangers, difficulties and complexities SAR teams face. The following also touches upon the expertise required from all involved in a SAR offshore operation.

Upon the helicopter arriving over the ship, the pilots contacted the vessel’s first officer on duty at the stern bridge DP panel via VHF radio frequency, who was in contact with the ship’s deck crew on UHF radio frequency. They initially planned to hoist the SAR operative down onto the ship’s cargo railing walkway, a gangway approximately one point-five metres wide that surrounds the ship’s main deck’s port, starboard and aft sides. The ship’s captain informed the helicopter pilots that they did not want to lift from the cargo railing walkway as the sea was rough. He requested that the hoisting occur aft amidships in the dedicated yellow marked hoist circle designated with the text WINCH ONLY. There was approximately a five to six-metre difference in height from the top of the cargo railing to the yellow centre line hoisting point on the ship’s aft deck.

The pilots requested the ship’s chief officer to turn the ship twenty degrees to starboard and proceed ahead with steering speed to avoid the mechanical turbulence that can build up behind the vessel’s superstructure if the wind comes in straight from the ship’s bow.

The helicopter crew conducted a pre-winch briefing led by the winch operator, where important aspects of the hoisting exercise related to safety were reviewed. They went through what they call Triple H (Height, Heading, Hazard) and Triple E (Entry, Emergency, Exit). They identified the safest possible way in and out as well as emergency procedures and obstacles on the ship.

The MPSV Skandi Hugen had knuckle cranes on the port and starboard side amidships. Due to the wind, the sea state and poor visibility, it was decided to request the ship’s bridge crew to light up the stern deck during the hoisting. The aft deck was forthwith illuminated as requested.

The ship was sailing with a steering speed of about one and a half knots as the commander manoeuvred the helicopter over the ship in a dummy run at eighty feet above sea level. With the bow twenty degrees off the incoming seas at this speed, the ship’s stern was rolling and pitching. The winch operator noticed he was inhaling exhaust from the ship’s exhaust funnels, and the aircraft commander asked the crew on the bridge to turn the ship heading a further ten degrees to starboard. Then the helicopter would face the wind directly and thus avoid turbulence behind the wheelhouse on the ship, and the exhaust from the ship would not affect the winch operator.

After the first dummy run, the helicopter returned to a close offset position relative to the ship (portside). A second dummy run was carried out at the same height as before to see if the ship’s heading had improved for the winch operation. The SAR operative approved the operation by notifying “Go Rescue.” The helicopter was then flown aft to a resting position astern of the ship. The captain then manoeuvred the helicopter towards the ship based on information from the winch operator to come in on top, the position where the SAR operative was to be lowered. The winch operator paid out by hand the control hi-line with a six-kilogram weight onto the vessel’s deck, whereupon the vessel’s deck crew grabbed the control hi-line the helicopter moved out to a rest position (portside).

The winch operator routinely verified (buddy checked) that the SAR operative was wearing the rescue equipment correctly and had engaged the winch wire carabiner before the helicopter’s starboard side door was slid open. The winch operator checked the zip on the survival suit, that the inflatable life jacket securing and Velcro were closed, that the harness was correctly fastened, that the quick coupling was secure, that the chinstrap on the helmet was closed and that the rescuer had a knife. The SAR operative was hoisted to the desired height to clear the port side cargo railing. He communicated with the winch operator using the Polycom 9 radio set and hand signals. The helicopter was then manoeuvred to the close offset position with the SAR operator hanging from the suspended wire.

From the close offset position, the helicopter was flown towards the on top position following instructions from the winch operator. When the lift operator believed they were on top/over the target yellow circle, the SAR operator was ready to be lowered. The pilots switched on the helicopter’s lighting to observe the waves better and thus identify a calm wave period. If the ship encounters large waves, waiting until a calm wave period is beneficial; often, every seventh wave is the largest. The winch operator could not anticipate the waves in front of the ship. This can be attributed to several factors: the lack of available ambient light and difficulty determining wave height with shadows and glare from spotlights.

The SAR operator was then lowered. The helicopter came four to five meters too far forward, which meant the rescuer had a small but controllable pendulum movement during the lowering. The winch operator guided the commander back to the desired on top position while the crew on deck worked to keep the controlling hi-line taut.

The winch operator continued lowering the rescuer toward the ship’s deck. Upon the SAR operative reaching what is referred to as the point of no return, he experienced a pendulum movement with such great speed that there was a risk of injury. He considered the risk to be less by landing on top of one of the two massive FRAMO TRANSREC hangars (oil spill prevention equipment containers) that were positioned bordering the port and starboard side of the yellow winch-only target on the ship’s deck rather than being hoisted back up and potentially colliding with structures on deck. He tried to pull his feet up to avoid catching them in a longitudinal hatch cover opening on the port side transfer hangar but slipped on top.

In the next moment, a substantial wave impacted the ship raising the ship’s stern, and the rescuer fell several meters down onto the deck. The winch operator saw that the rescuer had fallen and asked him over the Polycom 9, “Was it all right?” but no reply was forthcoming.

The chief officer communicated with the helicopter on the VHF radio and said, “It looked like he landed hard.” The winch operator then paid out the wire to prevent the SAR operator from being yanked up.

The commander heard over the Polycom 9 that something untoward had happened to the SAR operator and manoeuvred the helicopter slightly backwards to be able to see what had happened on deck. The rescuer was on his knees and had lost his breath but managed by his own accord to disconnect himself from the hoist carabiner.

The helicopter crew discussed what to do next. The SAR operator said he had crushed his right side, could not get into the helicopter alone, and needed assistance. The pilots, therefore, had to fly back to Ekofisk to pick up a new SAR operator and SAR nurse. In the meantime, the injured SAR operator was put on a ship’s stretcher and provided with first aid care.

Back at Ekofisk Lima, the SAR operator and a nurse boarded the aircraft. The winch operator and co-pilot remained on board; a colleague replaced the former commander. The helicopter flew the shortest way back to MPSV Skandi Hugen to hoist the SAR operator down onto the ship’s deck in the same area where the SAR operator had been injured.

The weather had worsened since the first trip. The pilots asked the chief officer on the vessel’s bridge to put on a searchlight on the port side to better read the waves and thus identify a calm period for hoisting. The helicopter crew performed a dummy run where a control hi-line was lowered before the helicopter was flown to the close offset position.

The uninjured SAR operative and a stretcher were hoisted down to the injured SAR operative. The winch wire was temporarily released and raised clear of the ship’s deck retained by the controlling hi-line. The commander manoeuvred the aircraft back into rest position with the control hi-line held by the deck crew. The injured rescuer was placed on a stretcher, wrapped, and secured. The aircraft was then repositioned on top, and during two operations, the stretcher with the injured SAR operative and the non-injured SAR operative was recovered back into the helicopter.

The nurse then started medical treatment, and upon the new rescuer being hoisted into the aircraft, they flew the casualty directly to Stavanger University Hospital (SUS), where he remained for five days receiving medical treatment for eight broken ribs and a punctured lung.

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Thirty-one deadly accidents have occurred since the first recorded fatal commercial helicopter flight in the North Sea Basin on 09 July 1973. The fixed-wing Dan-Air charter aircraft crash that took the lives of two pilots and fifteen oil field workers referenced above is not included in the helicopter fatalities tally.

In the UK sector, nineteen pilots, five SAR crew, two cabin attendants, one hundred and one passengers, and two helideck assistants have died.

Twelve pilots, five SAR crew, fifty-one passengers, and one helideck assistant have died in the Norwegian sector.

Eight pilots, two SAR crew members, and nine passengers have died in the Danish, Icelandic, and Nederlands sectors.

As of 28 February 2024, the total number of fatalities related to helicopter accidents and incidents during or as a direct consequence of oil and gas field exploration and offshore SAR in the North Sea basin, including pilots, cabin attendants, SAR winch men, SAR winch operators, SAR doctors, SAR nurses, passengers, and helideck crew, stands at two hundred and seventeen. This count spans from the first recorded fatal accident on 09 July 1973 to the most recent and hopefully last fatal crash on 28 February 2024. The incidents detailed in this timeline may have been reported inaccurately,  certain specific information could be incorrect, and there is a possibility that early incidents went unreported.

In addition to those who died, a significant number of people suffered severe life-lasting physical injuries. Others suffered psychological and mental harm that also affected a number of the people who had to deal with the aftermath of these accidents, such as surface rescue crew, divers, and not least, the distraught relatives of the deceased.

The above-listed incidents are daunting, albeit one has to keep in mind the vast number of flights undertaken over the decades.

The Norwegian research organisation SINTEF has conducted four studies on helicopter safety in the Norwegian and British sectors. The first study showed that the helicopter fatality risk among oil field workers in the Norwegian sector was four point one fatality per one million personnel flight hours from the start of oil operations in July 1966 until 1989. That number was considered irresponsibly high. Study number two, which studied 1990 to 1999, showed that the risk had halved to two point three fatalities per million flight hours; from 2000 onwards, the danger has subsequently been further reduced.

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For your convenience, click the button below to go to incidents that occurred between 1964 & 1993

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